ABSTRACT Recently, we proposed a quantum solution to the problem of private set intersection cardinality (PSI-CA) (Information Sciences 370-371 (2016) 147-158). Compared to classical solutions, the proposed quantum PSI-CA protocol achieves an exponential reduction in communication complexity, since it only needs O(1) communication cost. However, this protocol requires two additional assumptions about the cardinalities of the sets, which may limit its wider applications. In this paper, we successfully discard these assumptions and present a stronger quantum PSI-CA protocol without any limitation. The new protocol ensures the parties' private security, i.e., unconditionally secure server privacy and statistically secure client privacy, and it achieves the constant computation and communication complexities, which are independent of the size of the sets. Therefore, it is more suitable for practical applications with big data sets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) allows a number of mutually distrustful parties to compute a joint function of their inputs without leaking any information about their respective private inputs [1] , [2] . Due to its important military and business values, SMC has raised widespread concerns and has been extensively researched in the cryptographic community, since it was first introduced by Yao [3] .
Private Set Intersection Cardinality (PSI-CA) is a primitive of SMC that enables two parties, each with a private set, to jointly compute the cardinality of their intersection without disclosing any private information about their respective sets [4] . There are many important and practical applications of PSI-CA in privacy-preserving and information-sharing settings [5] . For instance, PSI-CA can be used in anonymous authentication [4] , authenticating a remote user without revealing his/her identity, e.g., when a remote user requests the server to authenticate his/her legality, the server asks the user to jointly execute a PSI-CA protocol and further verifies whether the intersection cardinality of their respective private sets is equal to a constant, which is assigned by a trusted third party in advance. Moreover, PSI-CA is useful in social networks [6] , e.g., when two parties want to privately determine the number of common connections in order to decide whether it exceeds a threshold value and further decide whether or not to become friends, it only needs to jointly run a PSI-CA protocol, where each element of their respective private sets represents a connection. In addition, as an important block, PSI-CA can also be utilized to privately compute the length of the longest common subsequence of two physically separate parties, where the longest common subsequence is the longest common part of two sequences by deleting zero or more characters from two sequences. For example, how to privately determine the similarity of two DNA sequences. Other applications of PSI-CA still include privacy-preserving data mining [7] , location sharing [8] , the Hamming distance [9] , etc.
Due to its important and wide applications, there appeared many PSI-CA protocols [9] - [16] in classical settings. In these existing protocols, the most efficient PSI-CA protocol requires the linear communication complexity [9] . Obviously it is infeasible for new applications involved in Big Data (e.g., DNA sequences). In addition, the security of most existing PSI-CA protocols is based on the computational complexity assumptions, which are strongly challenged by the increasing capability of computation or algorithms. Especially, most computational assumptions are vulnerable to attack by the quantum computer. Therefore, the researchers for PSI-CA still focus on two important factors: the higher security and the lower communication complexity.
In order to improve the security and reduce the communication complexity, we first tried to solve the PSI-CA problem by using a quantum approach in [4] . Compared to classical solutions, the proposed quantum PSI-CA protocol achieves an exponential reduction in communication complexity, since it only needs O(1) communication cost. However, the proposed quantum PSI-CA protocol requires two additional assumptions about the cardinality of the sets, which limit its wider applications.
In this paper, we further focus on quantum solution to PSI-CA and present an improved quantum protocol for PSI-CA without any assumption, which is suitable for practical applications with big data sets.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. RELATED WORKS
In 2004, Freedman et al. [10] first considered several twoparty set-intersection problems and presented private set intersection (PSI) protocols by using homomorphic encryption to evaluate a secret polynomial. In addition, they also first extended the proposed PSI protocols to the corresponding PSI-CA protocols. Subsequently, there appeared many PSI-CA protocols [11] - [16] . Furthermore, in 2012, Cristofaro et al. [9] presented a novel PSI-CA protocol with linear computation and communication complexity, which was the most efficient PSI-CA protocol in previously proposed PSI-CA protocols. Cristofaro et al. [9] subtly introduced Diffie-Hellman key exchange to blind the private information and further built an efficient PSI-CA protocol based on the difficulty assumption of the discrete logarithm problem, which indeed achieved linear complexities in the size of input sets. However, for some applications with big data sets, even the most efficient PSI-CA protocols are still not efficient enough due to their communication costs, which linearly increase with the size of data sets. Furthermore, the security of these existing PSI-CA protocols is based on unproven difficulty assumptions, which are vulnerable to attack by the quantum computer.
With the advent of fast quantum algorithms [17] , [18] , classical cryptosystems, including symmetric and asymmetric (i.e., public key) cryptosystems, are facing enormous threatens and challenges. On the other hand, quantum cryptography opens a new era. The security of quantum cryptography is based on the physical principles of quantum mechanics, so it can provide the unconditional security in theory. Since Bennett and Brassard presented the first quantum key distribution protocol [19] , quantum cryptography has been widely studied and rapidly developed. Nowadays, a lot of results have been gained, such as quantum teleportation [20] , quantum secret sharing [21] , quantum secure direct communication [22] , quantum signature [23] , and so on.
At the same time, SMC was also studied extensively in quantum fields [24] - [26] . However, unfortunately, Lo [27] , Colbeck [28] and Buhrman et al. [29] pointed out that unconditionally secure two-party quantum computations are impossible. But the existing achievements show that although there is not a perfectly secure two-party quantum computation, quantum protocols can still provide a reasonable security improvement over classical related protocols, such as quantum bit commitment [30] and quantum coin tossing [19] .
Recently, we presented a probabilistic two-party quantum protocol computing PSI-CA [4] , which can output a good estimator of the intersection cardinality with high probability and small error. Compared with the classical relevant protocols, our proposed quantum PSI-CA protocol has at least two good advantages: higher security and lower communication complexity. Especially, it achieves the communication complexity of O(1), which is fully independent of the size of data sets. However, this protocol requires two additional assumptions: (1) |C| + |S| < N 2 ; (2)|C| and |S| are public, where C and S are the sets of the client and the server, respectively, and all elements of their respective sets belong to Z N = {0, 1, 2, . . . , N − 1}. Obviously, these additional assumptions will certainly limit its wider applications. In this paper, we try to discard any unnecessary assumption to build a stronger quantum PSI-CA protocol without losing any good feature of the original protocol [4] .
B. PRIVATE SET INTERSECTION CARDINALITY
Definition 1: Private Set Intersection Cardinality (PSI-CA) -There are two parties, a client and a server. The client inputs a private set C and the server inputs a private set S. After running a PSI-CA protocol, the server outputs the cardinality of their intersection, i.e., |C ∩ S|, but the client gets nothing. In addition, PSI-CA should meet the following privacy requirements:
Server Privacy. The client cannot get any private information about the server's set.
Client Privacy. The server cannot get any private information about the client's set.
The above definition gives the stronger privacy requirements than the original definition of [4] , because there is no requirement or limitation about |S| and |C|.
C. QUANTUM COUNTING
In later proposed quantum PSI-CA protocol, we will follow some ideas from quantum counting. So here we first review quantum counting. In [31] , the counting problem is formulated mathematically: given an oracle function
where N ∈ N, find t, the number of x ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , N } such that f (x) = 1. N is known, thus, finding t is equivalent to finding p = t N , the probability of getting an x with f (x) = 1 when x is picked randomly. Based on quantum parallelism [4] , clearly, the quantum counting approach [4] , [31] , [32] has higher efficiency than the classical one. In addition, the quantum counting approach achieves much faster convergence rate than the classical one [31] . Furthermore, we simply review VOLUME 6, 2018 quantum counting algorithm, and readers may refer to [4] , [31] , and [32] for details.
In the above algorithm, G is the amplitude amplification operator [4] , [15] , defined by
where I is the identity operator. Here, the amplitude amplification operator G is also known as the Grover iteration or Grover operator, whose quantum circuit is illustrated in fig 1 [17] . In addition, QFT −1 denotes inverse quantum Fourier transfer, which is defined by,
Theorem 1 [4] , [31] : ∀M ∈ N, the quantum counting algorithm outputsp such that
Corollary 1 [4] , [31] :
| with probability at least 8 π 2 .
III. PROPOSED QUANTUM PSI-CA PROTOCOL
In the following protocol, suppose that the client's private set is C and the server's private set S. Without loss of generality, we assume that all components of the two sets lie in Z N , where Z N = {0, 1, 2, . . . , N − 1} and N = 2 n . The proposed protocol consists of 4 steps, which are described in detail as follows.
IV. ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON A. CORRECTNESS
By the encoding method,
Furthermore, based on the hiding method of the client, we can easily get
In addition, in Step 4 of the above proposed protocol, the server outputst j = Nsin 2 (x j M π ) as an estimator of N −1 i=0 x j,i · y i . Accordingly, we further prove its correctness as follows:
Suppose that there are t j components satisfying
Choose θ ∈ (0,
Algorithm 2 Quantum PSI-CA Protocol (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x 15 ) = (0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0) , where the number of one in the vector is just equal to the cardinality of the set C. Step 3-Quantum transformation and transmission (by the client)
(1) The client prepares m initial states | ψ 0 s, which are all in
The client performs an oracle operator U j on each initial state | ψ 0 , which implements
The client sends m quantum states {| ψ 1 , | ψ 2 , . . . , | ψ m } to the server through the quantum channel.
Step 4-Quantum transformation and quantum counting (by the server)
(1) The server performs a similar oracle operator U s on each received state | ψ j , which implements
The server performs another oracle operator U f on each state | φ j , which implements
The server runs quantum counting algorithms m times to count the number of the components satisfying x j,i · y i = 1 in each | ϕ j as follows: For j = 1 to m { Prepare two registers in the initial state Figure 2 ) is defined by
Similarly, call the resultant state | R 1 . Apply QFT −1 on the first register of | R 1 . Call the resultant state | R 2 . Measure the first register of | R 2 to obtain |x j and outputt j = Nsin 2 (x j M π ). } (4) The server computes: t = m j=1t j , which is his final output of the intersection cardinality.
By the definition of the operator G (see Eqs. (7, 8, 9) ), whose quantum circuit is illustrated in Figure 2 , it can get,
VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 2. Circuit for the iteration, G, in Step 4.
Furthermore, we define two orthogonal states as follows:
Then, (14) and (15)
(by Eqs. (14) and (15))
That is, | φ + and | φ − are eigenvectors of G with eigenvalues e 2iθ and e −2iθ , respectively. Let θ = π ω, then
Accordingly, we will get
After applying QFT −1 to the first logM qubits of the state
where
If making a measurement on |x + in the computational basis
(see Refs. [15] , [33] ). That is, if we make a measurement on |x + , the probability of getting either M ω or M ω is at least To sum up, the proposed quantum PSI-CA protocol ensures the correctness.
B. SECURITY
In the whole protocol proposed above, the server does not send out any quantum or classical message. Clearly, the client cannot get any private information about the server's set. That is, Server Privacy is unconditionally secure. In the following section, we focus on Client Privacy.
In the proposed protocol, the client only sends out m quantum states: | ψ 1 , | ψ 2 , . . . , | ψ m , without any classical message, where
Although all classical information about his private vectors is embedded into these states, no one can extract all this information by the physical principles of quantum mechanics. For a dishonest server, he can extract the client's partial private information from these received states by the following possible attacks.
The first attack is to directly make a projective measurement on the state | ψ j (i.e.,
). Accordingly, he will get | x j,i for any i with the probability of 1 N . If x j,i = 0, he cannot get any privacy information of the client because he cannot determine whether x i is equal to 0, where x i = m i=0 x j,i . If x j,i = 1, he can deduce that i ∈ C (i.e., he knows a component of the client's private set). Furthermore, by the encoding and hiding methods, it is clearly shown that the probability of the result of x j,i = 1 is |C| mN . Here m is a secure parameter, which can be determined by the client in advance, such that |C| mN is small enough. It implies that if the server wants to learn a component of the client's private set from one of his received quantum states, the successful probability is very low (i.e., , where r ≤ m. In fact, the client always can determine a secure parameter m by the size of his private set and the public parameter N , such that the amount of information leakage is small enough. In addition, if the server performs this attack, he will lose the chance to further compute the final result of |C ∩ S|, due to No-cloning Theorem which forbids the creation of identical copies of an arbitrary unknown quantum state.
The second attack is to count the number of | x j,i satisfying x j,i = 1 or 0 in each quantum state | ψ j by using quantum counting algorithm. Furthermore, the server can get an estimator of |C| in theory. But he cannot get any privacy information about the contents of the client's set C. Similarly, if he performs this attack, he will also lose the opportunity to finally get the intersection cardinality.
In addition, the dishonest server still can perform a more complicated attack that he tries to compute the summation of all received quantum states by the help of a powerful oracle operator, since he knows that the client uses the classical secret splitting technology to hide his private encoded vector. Suppose that there is an oracle operator O, which is defined by, (25) for any i j ∈ {0, 1}. Then, after applying the oracle operator O on all received quantum states, the dishonest server will get,
In Eq.26
However, due to the randomness VOLUME 6, 2018 of the measurement, the probability of extracting a private component of the client's encoded vector (i.e., x i ) from the final quantum state in Eq.26 is only 1 N m−1 , which is negligible. Therefore, our proposed protocol can resist this attack. And if the server performs this attack, he will also lose the chance to finally get the intersection cardinality.
We have analyzed the security of proposed protocols in ideal settings. That is, our proposed quantum PSI-CA protocol achieves the unconditional security of Server Privacy and the statistical security of Client Privacy. However, in practical settings, there may be some faults (e.g., noise and error) in the quantum channel and measurement. In order to ensure its security in practical settings, we can use the fault tolerant technologies, such as decoherence-free states and errorcorrecting code, which were introduced in [33] and [34] . In addition, we can also use the decoy-particle technology [4] to ensure the security of the quantum channel.
C. PERFORMANCE AND COMPARISON
In the proposed protocol, it only requires to transmit m quantum states from the client to the server, and it mainly runs m quantum counting algorithms. Therefore, the computation complexity and the communication complexity are O(m), which is independent of the size of the sets.
On the one hand, the bigger the secure parameter m is, the higher the security of the protocol is. On the other hand, the bigger the parameter m is, the higher the communication costs are. However, |C| mN < 1 m , so m is usually a small integer, e.g., m = 4 in our above example. Especially, for some applications with small |C|, we can let m = 2. In general, the size of the server's set is bigger than that of the client's set in many practical applications, e.g., anonymous authentication [4] . Accordingly, we can make m = 2 in these applications. Of cause, the client can choose an appropriate parameter m against information leakage by practical requirements. No matter what, m is usually a very small integer, e.g., m = 2, 3, 4, 5.
Furthermore, we give a comparison of our new protocol and other related protocols in Table 1 . Compared with the most efficient classical PSI-CA protocol with the linear complexity (i.e., O(|C| + |S|)), Obviously, our protocol requires lower communication and computation costs, especially in applications with big data sets. In addition, our protocol obtains higher security, because it can resist the attacks of the quantum computer or the adversary with quantum computing power.
Compared with our recently proposed protocol [4] , the biggest advantage of our new proposed protocol is to discard two additional assumptions about the cardinalities of two sets, which limits its wider applications. That is, our new protocol does not have any limitation, so it is suitable for any application in theory, including any large size of the sets. Of cause, our new protocol enhances the performance with slightly lower computation and communication complexity.
In addition, we can easily see that the necessary quantum resource, the most complex quantum operator and the most complex quantum measurement in our new proposed quantum PSI-CA protocol are 2n-qubit entangled state prepared by the client in Step 3, the Grover operator G and the von Neumann measurement in N -dimensional Hilbert space performed by the server in Step 4, respectively. Currently, it is difficult to implement some complicated quantum operators and measurements in high-dimensional Hilbert space. However, there are also lots of great implementation achievements in quantum information processing by the newest reports [35] - [42] . Especially, it can successfully implement the preparing and transmitting multi-qubit entangled states [35] , [40] , [41] . Therefore, at present, although our protocol only provides a theoretical approach to the PSI-CA problem, we believe that it is possible to implement it in the near future.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a stronger quantum PSI-CA protocol without any assumption and limitation. The proposed quantum PSI-CA protocol makes the best of quantum parallelism of quantum encoding and the randomness of quantum measurement, and subtly introduces the classical secret splitting technology, and accordingly it achieves better performances, i.e., the constant computation and communication complexities, the perfect security of Server Privacy and the statistical security of Client Privacy. Furthermore, we hope that our methods can provide some new ideas to solve more secure multi-party computations in future.
